MORAL HAZARD IN MARKET TRANSACTIONS AND OPTIONS FOR MITIGATION AND ELIMINATION
Ключові слова:
Moral hazard, agent`s problems, market transactions, transaction`s control, decreasing of moral hazard.Анотація
The problem of moral hazard is very relevant for the present time. Moral hazard initially comes
from the basic problem of agency relationship - namely, from post contract opportunism. It lies in the
fact that after the conclusion of the contract agent's actions may not correspond to the interests of the
principal. This problem occurs for two reasons. Firstly, the principal and agent may have different
interests. Secondly, a large value has asymmetries of the information that we will consider in future.
Moral hazard is indicated by the probability of the adverse effects conclusion of the contract to the
actions of the agent. There is a problem of principal-agent, which will also be discussed in this paper.
For the first time the term "moral hazard" arises in the literature devoted to problems of insurance.
Moreover, in future with the development of institutional theory, scale impact and spread obtain large
value.
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